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ABSTRACT: Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with 
conﬂicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought 
to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following 
nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not 
independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming 
conﬂicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our 
beliefs to count as justiﬁed can shift according to the moral stakes. On 
this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reﬂects a failure to 
not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to 
attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we 
believe. 
1. THE MOTIVATING CASE 
A consequence of living in a society shaped by racist attitudes and institutions is that the 
epistemically rational agent—the one who attends to and believes on the basis of the 
strength of their evidence—may be forced to believe in accordance with evidence that 
supports beliefs that they would otherwise reﬂectively reject. For example, our social 
environment is one in which, to use a standard example from Tamar Gendler (2011), that 
the man standing in the lobby is black provides a substantial amount of evidential support 
for the belief that he is a staﬀ member. On one hand, it seems that no matter how strongly 
race correlates with whether one is a staﬀ member in your environment, it is morally 
impermissible to believe that he is a staﬀ member. On the other hand, the belief seems 
epistemically justiﬁed. If one had more hands, one might go further and add that it would 
be epistemically irrational not to believe that he is a staﬀ member as that would involve 
the willful disregarding of pertinent evidence. Many conclude that in such cases we face 
an irresolvable conﬂict between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought 
to believe. I disagree. I argue that we have the resources to resolve this tension if we take 
 I am deeply grateful to the following people for comments on various drafts and interesting discussions that 1
have helped shape my thinking on this topic (in alphabetical order): Mike Ashﬁeld, Endre Begby, Steve Bero, 
Renée Bolinger, Gabe Dupre, Kenny Easwaran, Erik Encarnacion, Maegan Fairchild, Stephen Finlay, Jamie 
Fritz, Georgi Gardiner, Pamela Hieronymi, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Robin Jeshion, Gabbrielle Johnson, 
Shieva Kleinschmidt, Sarah Moss, Jessie Munton, Michael Pace, Mark Schroeder, Will Reckner, and Ralph 
Wedgwood. There are likely several people I’ve forgotten, and for that I sincerely apologize. I also apologize for 
any relevant literature that I’ve left out. The literature on moral encroachment has exploded in the time that 
this paper has been kicking around, and I am both relieved and terriﬁed to ﬁnally let it go. Part of the fear 
involved in letting it go was not being able to respond to and incorporate everything that is being written. I 
also have to thank audiences at Duke, Wayne State, University of British Columbia, McMaster, Georgetown, 
Claremont McKenna College, Queen’s, Simon Fraser, University of Missouri, University of Victoria, Virginia 
Tech, Barnard, the University of California Santa Cruz, and the Central European University. Your questions 
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seriously the following nagging suspicion: the epistemic standards governing belief are not 
independent of moral considerations.  
 I will be developing an account of radical moral encroachment that is motivated by 
that very nagging suspicion. According to moral encroachment, the epistemic justiﬁcation 
of our beliefs can be determined, in part, by the moral demands of our situation, i.e., the 
moral stakes. If we start with the intuitive thought that in some cases there are higher 
standards of evidence we must meet for our beliefs to count as justiﬁed—namely, high 
stakes cases—this framework lends itself naturally to capturing an additional way in 
which high stakes can be triggered—a failure to appreciate how you might morally wrong 
another person given what you believe.   2
 To begin making the case for moral encroachment, let alone a more radical form of 
moral encroachment, consider again the following standard case modiﬁed from Gendler 
(2011). In the following case, a social club’s discriminatory membership practices have 
resulted in a stark racial divide between club members and staﬀ members: only a small 
fraction of the club’s members are black, whereas all of the club’s staﬀ members are black.  
Social Club. Agnes and Esther are members of a swanky D.C. social club with a 
strict dress code of tuxedos for both male guests and staﬀ members, and dresses for 
female guests and staﬀ members. While preparing for their evening walk, the two 
women head toward the coat check to collect their coats. As they approach the coat 
check, they both look around for a staﬀ member. As Agnes looks around she 
notices a well-dressed black man standing oﬀ to the side and tells Esther, “There’s a 
staﬀ member. We can give our coat check ticket to him.” 
In this case, it seems that Agnes’s belief is justiﬁed. That the man standing in the lobby is 
black (together with the racial makeup of the club) provides substantial evidential support 
for the belief that he is a staﬀ member. Agnes, however, has done something wrong. But 
what she’s done wrong, on the face of it, doesn’t seem like an epistemic mistake. Imagine, 
for example, that it’s a busy night at the club with approximately 500 guests, only 5 of 
whom are black, and 50 staﬀ members, all of whom are black. The chance of the well-
dressed black man being a club member is only 9%, and the chance that he is a staﬀ 
member is 91%. Now in most cases, 91% certainty would be more than enough to justify 
believing. For example, if I told you there was a 90% chance of rain tomorrow, it wouldn’t 
be irrational to believe that it’ll rain tomorrow. Further, if I asked you what you were 
planning to do tomorrow and you said you were planning to throw a BBQ, that’d be really 
odd. You’d be epistemically criticizable for disregarding the evidence.  If we are justiﬁed in 3
 See Basu (Forthcoming, 2019) and Basu and Schroeder 2019. For other defenses, see Fritz (2018), Pace 2
(2011), Schroeder (2018), Bolinger (Forthcoming), and Moss (2018a, 2018b). I also borrow the terminology of 
radical moral encroachment from Jamie Fritz, who ﬁrst marks a distinction between moderate and radical 
forms of moral encroachment in his paper, “Moral Encroachment and Reasons of the Wrong Kind” (in 
preparation). See also Alex Worsnip’s (Forthcoming) distinction between hard and moderate pragmatists and 
how to understand varieties of moral encroachment within that framework.
 There is something problematic about the agent who would never believe that it'll rain tomorrow short of 3
certainty. Nonetheless, you might feel that the 90% chance of rain is not suﬃcient to be justiﬁed in believing 
that it'll rain tomorrow. In such a case, we can change the case however we need to meet whatever higher 
threshold you desire for the agent to be justiﬁed in believing that it'll rain tomorrow. Notice further that 
although we can do this kind of evidential tinkering with the rain case until you have suﬃcient certainty to 
believe, the race case is diﬀerent. There is more moral resistance no matter how high the threshold is, and this 
suggests that there is something in principle problematic about believing on the basis of problematic social 
trends that can’t be washed out by tinkering with the evidential support. This moral resistance is what I hope 
to capture in my account of moral stakes. The moral resistance we feel is this risk of wronging, not merely the 
risk of being wrong. The latter is all that’s at work in deciding where to place the threshold for rain beliefs.
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believing that it’ll rain tomorrow on the basis of a 90% chance of rain, wouldn’t Agnes be 
similarly justiﬁed (or more justiﬁed) in believing that the well-dressed black man is a staﬀ 
member?  
 Despite seeming epistemically justiﬁed, believing a person is staﬀ on the basis of 
their skin color is a paradigmatic case of racism. Thus, such a case, and others like it, raise 
the troubling possibility that by simply attending to our epistemic obligations, we may 
contribute to the harms and wrongs of racism. In particular, we contribute to the harms 
and wrongs that accompany being racially proﬁled.  In light of such cases, one might be 4
tempted to follow Gendler and conclude that we face an irresolvable conﬂict between our 
moral obligations and what we epistemically ought to believe. I disagree. I suggest that 
these cases push us to rethink the assumption that pits moral considerations and 
epistemic considerations against each other: namely, the evidentialist assumption that the 
only considerations relevant to whether you should believe are evidential considerations. 
According to a standard presentation of the evidentialist position, moral considerations 
are neither here nor there when it comes to the question of whether a belief is justiﬁed. 
This assumption will be my target. 
2. TARGETING EVIDENTIALISM AND ROUTES TO MORAL 
ENCROACHMENT 
Evidentialism is committed to the claim that a doxastic attitude p is epistemically justiﬁed 
if and only if that doxastic attitude ﬁts with the evidence you have for p (see Conee and 
Feldman 2004). To get the intuitive feel for evidentialism, consider the following case. 
Suppose your friend Veronica tells you that she believes that the moon landing was a 
hoax. Not wanting to dismiss her out of hand, you go on to ask her for what evidence she 
has. Veronica oﬀers you some evidence that suggests that the moon landing was ﬁlmed on 
a sound stage. For example, the surprisingly high quality of the footage and the lack of 
stars in any of the photographs. We recognize that Veronica is mistaken. But, we also 
recognize why she believes what she does: she has some evidential basis for her belief. In a 
sense Veronica’s doxastic attitude “ﬁts with” the evidence she has for her belief that the 
moon landing was a hoax, but the evidence clearly doesn’t justify the attitude. The reason 
we ﬁnd her to be mistaken is that she does not have a suﬃcient evidential basis for her 
belief. Given that her evidence can be easily debunked she not only needs stronger 
evidence, she also needs more of it. 
 This vignette illustrates that the relationship between evidence and justiﬁcation is 
not straightforward. This point complicates the standard evidentialist picture since, 
 I’ve argued extensively in other work for the claim that this is in fact a racist belief and, ipso facto, morally 4
problematic. I want to avoid rehashing all of those arguments here and take this point for granted. However, I 
will quickly address one common refrain that accepts the morally problematic nature of the case but suggest 
it’s not the belief that’s morally problematic but the action on the basis of the belief. That is, you might worry 
here that in such cases the issue concerns treating someone as staﬀ rather than believing that they are staﬀ. To 
address this worry would take too long in this paper, and I give a longer treatment of this objection in Basu 
(Forthcoming). For the purposes of this paper, I will just make the following suggestive remark for why I 
disagree: in such a case, even the mere thought that someone is a staﬀ member given their race—absent any 
overt action—is still insulting (though maybe not as insulting). As an analogous case, imagine a person 
informing you that they believe women are bad drivers. Noticing your grimace, they assure you that despite 
this, they would never actually treat a woman any diﬀerently. Here, even if they're correct that they could 
avoid having these beliefs aﬀect their actions (a claim that itself is dubious at best), that does not make the 
belief any less insulting. See also Basu (2019) and Basu and Schroeder (2019) for more in defense of the claim 
that the belief itself can wrong.
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although the evidentialist is correct to note that there is a connection between justiﬁcation 
and evidence and that we should believe in accordance with the evidence, this gloss is too 
simplistic. Evidentialism, in its minimal and most intuitive form, leaves open two distinct 
questions about what it means for a doxastic attitude to “ﬁt with” your evidence. Whether 
a belief is epistemically justiﬁed depends on not only what our evidence is but also 
whether the evidence is suﬃcient.  5
 We can articulate this minimal intuitive gloss on evidentialism in the following 
probabilistic way: for each proposition p and body of evidence E, there’s some threshold 
for justiﬁcation, call it t, that it’s permissible to believe p on the basis of E only if the 
probability of p given E is greater than or equal to t. That is, the probability of p given E is a 
probabilistic gloss on the notion of strength of evidence for the proposition under 
consideration, and t simply corresponds to a suﬃciency condition that the strength of 
one's evidence must either meet or surpass to be justiﬁed. Call this idea Support.  
 For example, consider whether you are justiﬁed in believing that the kettle has 
boiled. The sound of a kettle whistling raises the probability of the belief being true. 
Further, it raises the probability higher than if you had just glanced at your watch and seen 
that the kettle has been on for two minutes. Both make it more likely than not that the 
kettle has boiled, but only the sound of the whistling raises the probability to a degree that 
is suﬃcient for being justiﬁed in believing that the kettle has boiled. 
 However, that threshold need not be the same for every belief. In some 
circumstances you would want stronger evidence, i.e., would want the threshold to be 
higher. In others, you might require weaker evidence, i.e., for the threshold to be lower. 
For example, when adjudicating someone’s guilt in a criminal case, the threshold is higher 
than when adjudicating a playground dispute. All of this is consistent with there being 
some threshold that the strength of one’s evidence must cross in order to justify belief. 
Justiﬁcation, then, is more than merely what evidence one has. 
 We now start to see where stakes-based encroachment accounts in epistemology 
gain traction: non-evidential considerations plausibly play a role in settling the question of 
how much evidence is enough evidence.  Suppose you are not allergic to nuts but simply 
have a general dislike for them. In such a case, a waiter’s assurance that they’re “pretty 
sure” there aren’t nuts in any of the dishes would be suﬃcient for you to justiﬁably believe 
that there aren’t nuts. However, if your dining partner Sarai is deathly allergic to nuts, then 
the waiter’s assurance no longer suﬃces. Sarai, given the stakes, should not believe that 
none of the dishes contain nuts. However, the evidential situation for both you and Sarai is 
identical. Proponents of stakes-based encroachment views in epistemology argue that the 
diﬀerence in our intuitive judgements concerning justiﬁcation suggests that justiﬁcation 
depends not only on the evidence, but also what’s at stake and by changing a practical 
feature of the scenario—what is at stake for Sarai—we have thereby changed what she is 
epistemically justiﬁed in believing.  
 Such a view, however, is controversial (see, for example, Brown 2013). Despite the 
controversy, many have begun to argue that moral features can also make such a 
diﬀerence to justiﬁcation and epistemic rationality. For example, Michael Pace (2011) 
suggests that there is no purely epistemic rationale for setting the threshold for 
 One might worry here that evidentialism doesn’t have any intuitive plausibility to start with. Consider, for 5
example, that evidentialism fails as an explanation for the justiﬁcatory status of certain classes of belief. 
Reasons to believe mathematical truths or a priori truths do not rest on one’s evidence, nor do cases of self-
knowledge require that an agent believe in accordance with her evidence. However, for empirical beliefs, like 
Veronica’s, evidence does seem like what we look for to determine whether the belief is rational and justiﬁed. 
Since beliefs about others are empirical, evidentialism seems an apt requirement on such beliefs.
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justiﬁcation in one place rather than another. Rather, the evidential standards one adopts, 
i.e., how one determines the threshold, is determined by and varies according to both 
pragmatic and moral factors. Similarly, although Sarah Paul and Jennifer Morton (2018a, 
2018b) do not call their account an account of moral encroachment, they do note that, 
although evidential policies govern the way we adjust our evidential thresholds in 
diﬀerent contexts, there is no uniquely best evidential policy to have. There are multiple 
evidential policies that are rationally permissible for a given thinker to have from the 
point of view of purely epistemic considerations. Further, if that’s the case, then practical 
and ethical considerations can and should play a role in deciding between epistemically 
permissible policies.   6
 Further, in an account of moral encroachment that is oﬀered by Sarah Moss (2018a, 
2018b) and Renée Bolinger (2018), when we use statistical reasoning about a group to 
conclude something about an individual member of that group our failure to keep in 
mind the salient possibility that the individual may be an exception to the statistical 
generalization is both a moral and an epistemic failing. However, given that Bolinger and 
Moss’s account concerns beliefs formed on the basis of statistical generalizations, we 
might worry that there is something objectionable about the statistical nature of the 
evidence on which the belief in question is based. One might argue that what makes the 
moral stakes high is itself the statistical nature of the evidence, e.g., such beliefs would fail 
standard criteria for knowledge such as safety or sensitivity.  Although this is another way 7
to present an account of moral encroachment, if we go this route, we face two questions. 
First, the question of why statistical generalizations are uniquely subject to moral 
considerations, whereas forming beliefs on other kinds of evidence isn’t.  Second, we also 8
face the question of why some beliefs formed on the basis of statistical evidence seem ﬁne 
whereas others don’t, i.e., as the question has been put by Frederick Schauer (2006): what’s 
 These points, however, are not new. Although the connection is not often drawn, these points are echoed in 6
feminist critiques of the value-free ideal in science. For example, Richard Rudner (1953, p. 2) makes the point 
that “our decision regarding the evidence and respecting how strong is "strong enough", is going to be a 
function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the 
hypothesis.” See also Rebecca Kukla (2015) who notes how the discussion of the interest-relativity of evidence 
has occurred in isolation from the literature on inductive risk. See also Heather Douglas (2009) and Helen 
Longino (1987) for more on feminist critiques of the value-free ideal in science. Further, prior to pragmatic 
encroachment, Lorraine Code's (1987) account of epistemic responsibilism seems to gesture at a similar point.
 See, for example, Munton (2019) and Gardiner (2018) for critiques of this kind.7
 Within legal scholarship this is known as the problem of naked statistical evidence. See, for example, Schauer 8
(2006) and Buchak (2014). The common example goes as follows: we know that a bus has hit an individual, 
but the individual cannot identify the bus. 80% of the buses in the city are blue buses operated by the Blue Bus 
Company, whereas the other 20% are red and operated by the Red Bus Company. Given the balance of the 
probabilities, the individual was probably hit by a blue bus. However, this merely statistical evidence is not 
permissible in the courtroom. Further, if we had an eyewitness who was only reliable 80% of the time, that 
testimony would be allowed. Thus, we face a problem of explaining why the testimony is allowed, but the 
statistical evidence is not allowed. I set aside the issues as they appear in the legal scholarship, as my focus is 
not whether there is something objectionable about beliefs formed on the basis of statistical evidence. Rather, 
as I’ve stated, my focus is on beliefs that are formed without attention to the moral demands of one’s 
environment
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the contrast between proﬁling pitbulls on the basis of statistical evidence as opposed to 
people?   9
 A strength of the radical moral encroachment picture that will be defended in the 
next section is that it can answer these two questions. A central claim of radical moral 
encroachment is that certain beliefs have high moral stakes because such beliefs risk 
wronging, not only being wrong. We do not wrong objects when we form beliefs about 
them, but we do wrong agents. The primary examples motivating radical moral 
encroachment concern evidential environments that have been shaped by racial 
discrimination and racial stereotypes and how the beliefs we form contribute to the 
epistemic-structure of the social environments we navigate.  
 Finally, another route that has been oﬀered to moral encroachment is noting that 
insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are analogous 
good arguments for moral encroachment (see Fritz 2018). However, there are two issues 
we’d have to confront if we go this route. First, the examples often used are direct 
analogues to the traditional pragmatic encroachment cases and to rest a defense of moral 
encroachment on the plausibility of any particular account of pragmatic encroachment 
risks the plausibility of moral encroachment being undercut by less plausible versions of 
pragmatic encroachment. For example, such accounts tend to be motivated by a 
connection between knowledge and action (or justiﬁcation and action).  These stakes-10
related reasons, arise from the risk of error. Whereas traditional accounts of pragmatic 
encroachment have focused on practical costs, I suggest that a distinctive feature of moral 
encroachment is that moral risks of error are a special case of risks that aren’t tied directly 
to action. Rather, the risks are incurred simply by believing.   11
 I suspect the degree to which we feel uncomfortable with the pitbull induction will vary with respect to the 9
degree to which we see them as agents that are themselves a part of our social environment. As much as I love 
my dog, dogs are not people. We shouldn’t have the same intuitions in the two cases and although the 
inference that pitbulls are dangerous is intimately connected to the racial disparities I am interested in— the 
motivation behind breed speciﬁc legislation may not really be about the dogs at all but rather be a matter of a 
proxy by which some groups can target others on the basis of suspicions they have related to class, race, and 
ethnicity (see Dickey 2017)—it would obviously be insensitive and naïve to put this mistreatment at the same 
level of the racial oppression of human agents.
 For example, Stanley (2005) argues that his version of pragmatic encroachment, interest-relative 10
invariantism, is motivated from an intuitive connection between knowledge action. Similarly, Fantl and 
McGrath (2002, 2009) build their account of pragmatic encroachment around the following principle linking 
knowledge-level justiﬁcation and action: If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in φ-
ing, for any φ. In these standard accounts of pragmatic encroachment practical considerations encroach 
because of an intuitive connection between knowledge and/or justiﬁcation and action. The case that I have 
been using to motivate moral encroachment, however, does not concern action. The case concerns our beliefs 
about others. This raises worries about whether this will be a straightforward application of pragmatic 
encroachment, and these are worries that I am sensitive to. Moral stakes, we will see in Section 3, encroach in 
a manner dissimilar to practical stakes. Nonetheless, this remains a stakes-based encroachment account.
 To add one more account of moral encroachment, Mark Schroeder and I have previously defended another 11
account of moral encroachment as a response to what we called the problem of coordination (see Basu and 
Schroeder 2019). That is, moral encroachment oﬀers a promising answer to resolving the following sort of 
tension: how can a belief be rational in every way required for knowledge but still be morally wrong? If moral 
encroachment is right, then that troubling question does not arise. After all, if moral encroachment is right 
then it’s not possible for a belief to be rational in every way required for knowledge while still being morally 
wrong. The motivation for radical moral encroachment I will oﬀer in this paper, however, presents another 
route to moral encroachment. In this paper my goal is to show that the construal of epistemic rationality as 
believe in accordance with the evidence is fully compatible with epistemic rationality being sensitive to practical 
and moral considerations. In short, my strategy in this paper is to show that the moral isn’t really encroaching 
in epistemology, it has been there all along. For one more alternative route to moral encroachment, see also 
Schroeder (2018)
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 To motivate radical moral encroachment, we must bring together two threads that 
have been running through this paper. First, an unfortunate feature of our world, to put it 
lightly, is that our epistemic environments are often shaped by racist institutions and 
practices. The social club described in Section 1 is not an anomaly. There are many spaces 
we move through which have had histories of exclusion. As a result, when it comes to 
forming beliefs about who belongs in that space or doesn’t, who is a staﬀ member and 
who isn’t, these beliefs are high stakes beliefs. Further, these stakes aren’t practical stakes. 
They are moral stakes. The practical cost of missing a mortgage payment or getting on a 
slower train (as in traditional cases of pragmatic encroachment) is very diﬀerent from the 
kind of moral stakes involved with racist beliefs. The moral stakes concern other people 
and their standing in the world, their dignity, and respect. Consider again why being 
mistaken for a staﬀ member is a paradigmatic example of racism. Underrepresented 
groups are more often mistaken for employees because of the color of their skin and the 
racist institutions that make their skin color such a determining factor of their inability to 
gain access to more prestigious employment opportunities. Being mistaken in this 
context, namely one in which you’ve historically been excluded, is a moral wrong that is 
absent in spaces where that historical disadvantage is lacking. The evidentiary standard 
Agnes must meet before she can justiﬁably believe that John Hope Franklin is a staﬀ 
member is higher given the moral risks involved. Just as practical stakes can make it 
harder to believe, be justiﬁed, or know, so too can the moral stakes. 
 Next, there are two upshots to bifurcating the question of what we should believe 
into practical and moral considerations. First, we have opened a space for moral 
considerations to be part of the answer in a non-ad hoc way. Second, we preserve the 
minimal version of the evidentialist assumption that is responsible for generating the 
moral-epistemic conﬂict in the ﬁrst place. Agnes, recall, fails both epistemically and 
morally. Given the higher moral stakes her evidence does not pass the higher evidentiary 
burden she must meet. In ignoring the moral demands of her environment, i.e., the moral 
wrong that would be done forming her belief about a black man in a space where he has 
been historically excluded, Agnes fails to see that she lacks suﬃcient evidence to believe. 
Thus, her belief is both morally objectionable and epistemically irrational and we can 
capture the intuitive sense in which racist beliefs, and beliefs that seem like they could 
wrong, require more justiﬁcation than other beliefs.  
3. WHY RADICAL MORAL ENCROACHMENT ISN’T PRAGMATIC 
ENCROACHMENT 
My strategy now for demonstrating why radical moral encroachment isn’t just a 
straightforward extension of pragmatic encroachment is to show that if it were, we would 
expect certain analogous cases to hold but they do not. First, pragmatic encroachment is 
motivated by contrasting pairs of cases, one LOW and one HIGH. These cases are created 
by simply toggling a practical feature in the low stakes case to make it high stakes while 
leaving the evidence the agent has in the case unaltered. The change in our intuitions 
regarding justiﬁcation or knowledge in the high stakes case then demonstrates that our 
intuitions about justiﬁcation or knowledge are sensitive to the change in practical stakes. 
Intuitions about justiﬁcation in cases involving moral stakes, however, not toggled in the 
same way. We cannot create minimally contrasting low stakes variants of morally high 
stakes cases. Second, if moral encroachment is a straightforward extension of pragmatic 
encroachment, then moral stakes should be a straightforward extension of practical 
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stakes. However, in conjunction with my ﬁrst argument, I argue that, whatever moral 
stakes are, they must be understood diﬀerently than practical stakes. 
 Let us start by considering Social Club again. Plausibly, Social Club is a high stakes 
case. To build a contrasting case, then, we must ask three questions. First, what would the 
low stakes variants of the traditional pragmatic cases be; second, what is it that makes 
these cases high stakes; and third, is what makes these cases high stakes the same in both 
the pragmatic and the moral domains. To answer the ﬁrst question, we need a low stakes 
case in which an agent is permitted to believe p and a high stakes case where the agent is 
not permitted to believe p. These questions are related: understanding the source of 
diﬃculty in building minimally contrasting low stakes variants for moral considerations 
will in turn help us answer the second and third questions.  
 Consider the following attempt to construct a low stakes case and a contrasting 
high stakes case for Social Club. 
The Enlightened Northerner. Nathaniel is an enlightened visitor from the North who 
likes to keep track of how well-staﬀed social clubs are. He has found that in the 
South, staﬀ are predominantly black. During his visit to the Cosmos Club, he 
mentally makes a note of each black person he sees as a staﬀ member, and at the 
end of day, he leaves for the rest of his journey with the belief that there was one 
staﬀ member for every ten guests. One of those people he counts as a staﬀ member 
is John Hope Franklin, the club’s ﬁrst black club member. 
The Racist Club Member. Duke is a racist member of the Cosmos Club. Service has 
been bad today, so he wants to reprimand a staﬀ member in front of a lot of people 
in order to call attention to his dissatisfaction with the service. Furthermore, he 
wants the race of the staﬀ member to be a major focal point of his complaint. Duke 
sees a well-dressed black man standing oﬀ to the side, and, being a racist, assumes 
on the basis of his race that the staﬀ member must be lazy and deserving of 
punishment. Duke then proceeds to confront the man in an attempt to make an 
example of him.   12
One might think that only one of these cases demonstrates a wrong. According to this line 
of thought, Nathaniel doesn’t commit a wrong, but Duke clearly does. But I disagree. 
Nathaniel also wrongs John Hope Franklin when he so easily believes that he is a staﬀ 
member. Nathaniel is ignoring how his environment is shaped by the South’s racism, 
which here serves as the relevant moral feature of his environment that he is insensitive to. 
Consider further how we would feel if Nathaniel did take this into account. That is, given 
how racist the South is and the severe degree to which black men are prevented from 
occupying roles that would put them on equal footing with the club members, Nathaniel 
reasons that he’s in a very good evidential position to form his belief that John Hope 
Franklin is a staﬀ member. I can grant this and still note that this lends further support for 
considering moral encroachment as something distinct from pragmatic encroachment. 
From a practical considerations point of view Nathaniel has more reason to believe, but 
from the moral considerations point of view he is doing something wrong. It is for this 
reason that both Duke and Nathaniel fail to be justiﬁed in their beliefs. Moreover, these 
same considerations lead me to believe that both Duke and Nathaniel would fail to be 
 This set of cases was ﬁrst suggested to me by Steve Bero.12
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justiﬁed even if the person they picked out is in fact a staﬀ member.  Both fail to show the 13
moral care demanded by the unjust nature of the environment they ﬁnd themselves in. 
 There’s an oft-cited slogan that facts can’t be racist. Perhaps a good way of 
summarizing the crucial points of radical moral encroachment is with the following. Facts 
may not be racist, but they may be products of racism. When reasoning about these facts, 
we must not ignore their provenance. Thus, when forming beliefs on the basis of evidence 
that is a result of our racist history, it seems appropriate to ask for more moral care. But 
what, precisely, does this moral care amount to? It cannot simply be recognizing that the 
environment is racist. That doesn’t seem to be enough—for example, you might think that 
Nathaniel can recognize that fact, but then use that very fact as evidence that the black 
person he is seeing in the club is a staﬀ member. So, being sensitive to it isn’t merely a 
matter of knowing that we’re in a racist environment. Moral sensitivity amounts to not 
only a recognition of an unjust environment, but also an adjustment of one’s threshold for 
justiﬁcation to meet the moral stakes of that environment. Because what exactly moral 
sensitivity amounts to turns on the deeper question of what being a moral person requires 
of us, giving a full account of sensitivity will require a much deeper analysis than available 
here. But it's a start.  
 To illustrate with another analogy, consider the following case. You study African-
American history and you are putting together a book on poverty in 1930s America. Your 
focus is speciﬁcally on poverty in black communities, so you are visiting archives and 
collecting photos. The 1930s were a diﬃcult time, and you have very good reason to think 
that almost any picture you come across of an African-American family will be a picture 
of a family living in poverty. However, one of the pictures you include is of an African-
American family not living in poverty. Contrast this case with one in which you are a 
photographer putting together a book on North Dakota ranches and one of the pictures 
included in the book is mistakenly a picture of a South Dakota ranch. There is a wrong in 
the former case that is diﬀerent from the latter. It is not merely a matter of presenting 
things accurately. The problem in the ﬁrst case is that there exists a neglected demand for 
extra care and diligence when believing things of others. This same demand is not present 
when believing things of ranches. I suggest that what is going to separate a high stakes 
case from a low stakes one is that the wrong that’s being done has to do with the added 
layer of a moral injustice and concerns our interactions with other moral agents—in this 
case taking the form of a racial injustice.  
 Let’s return to our three questions. Regarding the ﬁrst—what would the low stakes 
variants of the traditional pragmatic cases be—we see the source of diﬃculty for creating 
minimal contrasting low stakes cases for moral encroachment is due to the very features 
that makes these high stakes cases. This, in turn, leads us to an answer to the second 
question—what is it that makes these cases high stakes? Answer: the socio-historical 
context in which the features are formed. Underrepresented groups are more often 
mistaken for employees because of the color of their skin and the racist institutions that 
make their skin color a determining factor in their inability to gain access to more 
prestigious employment opportunities. Being mistaken in this context, namely one in 
which you’ve historically been excluded, is a greater harm and wrong than being mistaken 
in a space where that historical disadvantage is lacking. It is this social and moral fact that 
we’ve been neglecting. It is this social and moral fact that makes all the cases so far seem 
 This is a diﬀerence between Schroeder (2018) and me. On Schroeder's view, only false beliefs can wrong 13
someone. However, the moral wrong involved in the kind of racial proﬁling that John Hope Franklin 
experiences, and the waitstaﬀ in The Enlightened Northerner experience, does not depend on whether the 
proﬁling is true or accurate.
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like high stakes cases. I conjecture that this is because of how deeply our social 
environments are steeped in and shaped by a history of racism. So, whereas we can toggle 
high stakes for agents in traditional pragmatic encroachment cases by stipulating that they 
have mortgage payments due, we cannot simply toggle a history of racism on or oﬀ to 
make simple high/low pairs of cases. 
 To envision such an environment for a low stakes variant would require invoking 
something like a twin-earth type scenario where our society hasn’t been shaped by the 
racist events and practices that it has. To do this we have to imagine a world where racism 
hasn’t formed the bedrock for society. What would that world be like? Presumably it 
would be one where a person’s skin color is as relevant to one’s social status as say, the 
length of one’s index ﬁnger, is in the actual world. Whatever that world is like, it has to be 
very diﬀerent from our actual world, incommensurably diﬀerent even. To imagine such a 
scenario is to so widen the distance between this world and the actual world that the 
comparison would ultimately have no substantive relevance, thus failing to constitute 
anything like a “minimal pair.” Potentially we could still try to build a minimal pair of 
cases by contrasting cases in which we reason about a dominantly-situated agent in the 
low stakes case and a non-dominantly situated agent in the high stakes case. Note, 
however, that this still won’t fulﬁll the same structure as the minimal pair cases motivating 
pragmatic encroachment because we are changing the people involved in the cases. To 
have the minimal pair we need two cases that are identical in every way except that in 
LOW there are no moral stakes and in HIGH there are moral stakes.  
 One might still wonder whether these moral stakes are simply practical stakes. If 
so, it might seem that moral encroachment is a mere extension of pragmatic 
encroachment, rather than a view that brings with it anything novel, surprising, or 
distinctive. This brings us to the third question that I set out at the start of this section: is 
what makes these cases high stakes the same in both the pragmatic and the moral 
domains? Ultimately, I will reject the idea that moral encroachment is a mere extension of 
pragmatic encroachment. However, for now, it will be helpful to explore this possibility. 
One way to conceive of moral encroachment as a version of pragmatic encroachment is to 
consider it an extension of practical stakes to others rather than ourselves. For example, 
consider the following ﬁrst-pass distinctions. 
Practical Stakes. A risk of being wrong you impose on yourself when you believe 
on the basis of insuﬃcient evidence. 
Moral Stakes (First Pass). A risk of being wrong you impose on others when you 
believe on the basis of insuﬃcient evidence. 
Practical stakes concern the agent’s preferences, whereas moral stakes take into account 
other people’s preferences. This is a point that has already been recognized. For example, 
consider the following pair of cases from Ross and Schroeder (2012, p. 261): 
Almond Butter-Low. Five minutes ago, Hannah made three sandwiches and placed 
them in the refrigerator. She told Sarah that she placed the peanut butter sandwich 
on the left, the tuna sandwich in the middle, and the almond butter sandwich on 
the right. Hannah then departed just as Sarah’s friend Almira arrived for lunch. 
Sarah knows that Almira has no allergies. Almira says: “I’d love an almond butter 
sandwich.” And so Sarah opens the refrigerator door, points to the sandwich on the 
right, and says: “The sandwich on the right is an almond butter sandwich. You can 
have it.” 
Almond Butter-High. This case is just like Low, except here it is Sarah’s nephew 
Algernon who is visiting for lunch, and he has a severe peanut allergy. He asks 
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Sarah for a sandwich. Sarah knows that the peanut butter sandwich would be fatal 
to Algernon, but that the almond butter sandwich would be harmless. She also 
knows that he would slightly prefer the almond butter sandwich to the tuna 
sandwich. When Sarah goes to the fridge, she can tell by visual inspection which is 
the tuna sandwich, but she cannot tell by visual inspection which is the peanut 
butter sandwich and which is the almond butter sandwich. So she gives him the 
tuna sandwich.  
These cases illustrate that it is not only your own stakes that can change whether you are 
justiﬁed in believing p, but also whether someone else is in a high stakes situation with 
regard to p can change your justiﬁcation as well.  
 In both cases, Sarah has the same evidence and the evidence supports the 
proposition that The sandwich on the right is an almond butter sandwich to the same 
degree. However, given the risk involved with acting on that belief for Algernon, our 
intuitive response is that Sarah is not justiﬁed in believing that the sandwich on the right 
is an almond butter sandwich. So, despite being in the same evidential situation, Sarah is 
justiﬁed in Almond Butter-Low and not justiﬁed in Almond Butter-High. As a result, it 
appears that not only do the stakes for the believer make a diﬀerence to whether she is 
justiﬁed, but the stakes for those who would be aﬀected by her acting on the belief make a 
diﬀerence to whether she is justiﬁed. But if this is all that moral stakes are, this is 
uninteresting. 
 Instead, as I have been suggesting, what is morally at stake in the cases we began 
with is an added insensitivity to background features of one’s environment. This involves a 
broadening of our understanding of how our epistemic practices are environment-
sensitive. There is a morally and epistemically problematic form of insensitivity that I have 
outlined earlier. This sensitivity is distinctive to our moral agency and it is what separates 
cases of high practical stakes concerning other people from high moral stakes concerning 
others. Thus, it’s critical that we capture this potential for insensitivity in our gloss of 
moral stakes. Here’s a second-pass attempt to capture this point: 
Moral Stakes (Second Pass). The risk one imposes on another person by failing to 
respond with suﬃcient sensitivity to the morally relevant features of the 
environment when settling a belief. 
This gloss on moral stakes focuses attention on what the non-evidential features relevant 
to settling belief in these cases are. Namely, the relevant features are moral facts that you 
should be sensitive to. This gloss captures something ignored in our usual way of thinking 
about what the stakes are, and ﬁts the following way to understand moral encroachment: 
as the demand to be woke. To be woke is to be aware of the moral demands of one’s 
environment. With regard to our epistemic practices, it is the demand to be aware of the 
moral stakes of our beliefs about one another. It is the demand to be aware of the 
background against which our epistemic practices exist, i.e., the unjust world we inhabit, 
and to ensure that our epistemic practices are not only responsive to unjust features of our 
environment but that they also do not themselves contribute to those unjust features of 
our environment. In short, it is a demand to practice what we might call good epistemic 
housekeeping going forward.  14
 Although this bears some similarity to the idea of practical stakes, it cannot be 
subsumed under our understanding of practical stakes. Recognizing that our environment 
 Thanks to Lisa Miracchi for pressing me to say more about this. The idea remains underdeveloped, but I 14
think its value—even as an initial attempt to name a kind of epistemic virtue we should be trying to habituate 
within ourselves—is signiﬁcant.
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can place moral demands on our epistemic practices results in a more robust form of 
pragmatism than is commonly defended. As a result, we should not think of radical moral 
encroachment as merely a straightforward application of pragmatic encroachment; rather, 
it builds upon the foundations laid by pragmatic encroachment and extends our 
understanding of the non-evidential considerations that matter for justiﬁcation.  15
4. SOME WORRIES 
To wrap things up, here are three seemingly perverse consequences that this account of 
moral encroachment might have. First, consider people who grow up in deeply prejudiced 
social settings with no access to contrary evidence. As Endre Begby (2018) argues, these 
people should be counted as victims. If you had the bad luck of growing up in a severely 
constrained socio-epistemic environment, then holding you responsible and morally 
blameworthy for the predictable consequences of your limited epistemic opportunities 
would be perverse. It would compound your plight. 
 Second, consider what this account of moral encroachment would recommend 
when it comes to believing things of any member of non-dominantly situated group. You 
must walk on epistemic eggshells.  However, by only walking on epistemic eggshells 16
around members of non-dominantly situated groups and being more free in your 
epistemic practices around members of dominantly situated groups you may end up 
compounding a wrong that’s done to them. Relatedly, whereas I have focussed on cases in 
which we wrong by believing when our evidence doesn't meet the higher evidential 
threshold demanded by the moral stakes, when it comes to members of non-dominantly 
situated groups it seems we also wrong them when we refrain from believing or when we 
fail to believe. 
 To address the second challenge ﬁrst let us consider the example of failing to believe 
on the basis of a woman’s testimony that she has been sexually harassed or assaulted. It 
would be inappropriate to say that it’s a case in which the stakes are high and so the 
 There is a point to be made here about how the cases that are traditionally used to motivate pragmatic 15
encroachment rely on A-stakes (see Worsnip 2015). A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an 
agent believes (or relies) on the proposition. On the other hand, there are W-stakes which track what is at 
stake respect to whether the proposition is true or false. That is, the relevant cost is the cost of the proposition 
of the potential belief being true versus being false as opposed to the cost of relying on the belief should it be 
false. Worsnip presents the following challenge for accounts of stakes-based encroachment: only a W-stakes 
reading preserves intuitions about knowledge attributes, whereas only an A-stakes reading preserve the 
putative link between knowledge and practical reasoning that motivates many pragmatic encroachment 
accounts. But as we see in light of the cases of interest to this paper, not only does it seem that our intuitions 
about knowledge-attributions diﬀer according to W-Stakes and A-stakes, but perhaps there are also M-stakes 
that don’t quite operate in the same way as either W-stakes or A-stakes.  
 As noted above, W-stakes are the stakes as to whether the proposition is true, whereas A-stakes are the 
stakes as to whether the subject ought reliantly believe or withhold from believing p. M-stakes are neither 
quite W-stakes or A-stakes. After all, in Social Club, it doesn’t make sense to say that the W-stakes are high or 
low. Partly why this is diﬃcult is because Worsnip only presents A-stakes and W-stakes as they pertain to you, 
not to others. For example, you might think that we perhaps could capture the stakes for others in terms of the 
W-stakes. But, Worsnip’s W-stakes only consider how the world turning out a certain way rather than another 
would be bad for the believer. Hence, it is unclear to me what the mapping between A-stakes, W-stakes, and 
moral stakes would be. A conclusion we can draw, however, is that the matter of stakes and what kind of stakes 
there are, or more diﬃcult than initially thought. There are not only plausibly two kinds of stakes, but 
potentially three. Thanks to Jessie Munton for pressing me on this point.
 I cannot remember who ﬁrst asked me this question or suggested this phrase. I feel like it was either Amy 16
Kind, Adrienne Martin, or Michele Moody-Adams. I’m sorry for forgetting who it was as this is a challenge 
that keeps me up at night.
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threshold for settling belief is also higher. What this suggests, however, is two important 
points. First, we have more evidence for the claim that practical and moral stakes diﬀer. 
Precisely the harm done by judges who suggest leniency in sentencing because of the risk 
to the rapists future is that the judges are focussing on the practical stakes, not the moral 
stakes. This brings us to the second point that what’s morally at stake in these cases is this 
background history of discrimination and discounting of the testimony of assault victims. 
This further suggests that the moral stakes can not only raise the threshold for evidence, 
but also lower it.  
 I am skeptical, however, that we’ll be able to articulate a general principle to 
determine in every case whether the threshold goes up or whether the threshold ought go 
down. The very same class of evidence—fact patterns that are the basis or result of an 
injustice—and the very same way of relating to others—taking the moral standpoint—can 
sometimes make the threshold go up and sometimes down. For example, it is easier (and 
perhaps ought be easier) to believe well of our friends. The threshold is lower. Similarly, 
perhaps to address the epistemic eggshells concern, when it comes to some situations we 
should be more ready to believe things of vulnerable groups than otherwise. Although I 
oﬀer this as a possible answer, I myself remain wary, and I ﬁnd myself wanting to bite the 
bullet when it comes to the epistemic eggshell worry. More is demanded of us in our 
interactions with and beliefs pertaining to non-dominantly situated groups. Often 
correcting for injustices involves adopting practices that appear unfair, but in reality are 
serving as a counterbalance for a history of unfairness. Perhaps there is no way we can 
completely morally relate to one another as we would in an ideal world, but that is just a 
reﬂection of the non-ideal world we ﬁnd ourselves.  17
 To return to the ﬁrst version of the perverse consequences worry, let me start by 
noting that although this is a serious challenge I think it brings to light a promising feature 
of taking the idea that moral stakes track what it means to do right by someone when it 
comes to what we believe of them. To see this, let me start with a biographic note. I did 
not learn about residential schools until I attended university. In no history textbook, 
class, or conversation was the fact that First Nation, Inuit and Métis children were 
removed from their homes and communities in the name of “assimilation” ever taught to 
me. What I was taught—what all Canadian children were taught—was constrained by a 
socio-epistemic environment that deeply wrongs First Nation, Inuit and Métis peoples. As 
I make revisions to this paper, the Canadian government has ﬁnally acknowledged its role 
in this genocide. 
 An account of doxastic morality that holds people responsible and morally 
blameworthy for the predictable consequences of our limited epistemic opportunities 
might be perverse. But, these wrongs at the level of the believer must be balanced against 
the fact that we must also do justice to this ongoing wrong that occurs when history is 
erased or forgotten. The wrong to First Nation, Inuit and Métis children is not just a 
wrong in how the Canadian government acted. If we do not accept responsibility and 
blame for our beliefs that are the result of forgetting or miseducation, we continue to 
 Gardiner (2018) notes this point as a challenge to any account of moral encroachment. She says, "[m]oral 17
encroachment risks making epistemic justiﬁcation contingent on myriad complex social factors that are 
intuitively irrelevant to epistemic justiﬁcation." But here’s the rub, beliefs are central to our social relationships 
with one another, and if we understand radical moral encroachment as a way of making good on the demand 
to stay woke, then the myriad of complex social factors are features of our epistemic environment that we 
ought be attending it. We are complex social creatures in a world shaped by complex social factors, it does not 
strike me as odd that epistemic justiﬁcation would similarly be shaped by complex social factors given that 
every other part of life is.
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contribute to a terrifying epistemological reality for the First Nation, Inuit and Métis 
peoples: we devalue their lives and experiences (see also Dotson 2018). 
 Third, if one will fail to be justiﬁed in virtue of failing to appreciate the burden and 
risks that they impose on another, then almost all beliefs about other people—especially 
any belief about a person on the basis of their race or another protected class—are going 
to be high stakes. This seems overly demanding because it requires moral agents to be 
fairly sophisticated in recognizing when they should occupy this kind of moral 
standpoint. As a result, if this level of sophistication is beyond the reach of most, then 
most (maybe all) of our beliefs about individuals from non-dominantly situated groups 
are unjustiﬁed. After all, it is not clear whether most people would ever ﬁnd themselves in 
a position to meet such a requirement. 
 My response should not be surprising. Morality is demanding. Moral encroachment 
brings moral considerations to bear on our epistemic practices. So, moral encroachment is 
similarly demanding. Recall that if we understand moral encroachment as a systematic 
treatment of the imperative to stay woke, staying woke is demanding. On does not simply 
wake up and stay woke. Rather, it is something that one has to work at everyday. Morality 
is much the same. There are moral costs associated with believing that should drive us to 
be more cautious. Given the picture we’ve been working with, we can see how the moral 
demands we place on one another extend beyond simply how we expect others to treat us, 
but also what others believe of us. All that moral encroachment requires is a certain level 
of epistemic humility when it comes to beliefs about others.  
 As Pamela Hieronymi (2006, 2008) has similarly noted, we are assessable for our 
epistemic characters. To practice the virtue of wokeness is to exercise a kind of indirect 
long-term control over how we engage in inquiry, what sources we attend to, when we 
stop inquiry and when we extend it, what evidence we look for and how we evaluate it, 
etc. Just as we are responsible and can be held accountable for the development of our 
moral character, I suggest that there is an epistemic virtue of wokeness that we are 
responsible and can be held accountable for, and that bears on the development of our 
epistemic character. It will be hard to sustain and develop this epistemic virtue, but it’s not 
easy being a good person 
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